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Abstract: Choice-based conceptions of substantive responsibility face a number of powerful 
counterexamples. In order to avoid some of these counterexamples, it is widely claimed that agents 
are substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from their choices only when the option set 
from which they chose satisfied a reasonability criterion. I examine three possible justifications for 
a reasonability criterion: an agent-responsibility-based motivation, a voluntariness-based 
motivation, and what I call a ‘denied-claim’-based motivation. In each case, I argue that the putative 
motivation cannot in fact justify a reasonability condition. I end with some comments on what this 
result means for choice-based conceptions of substantive responsibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is familiar to distinguish between disadvantage that results from chosen risk and disadvantage that 
results from unchosen risk. Agents, it is often said, have a weaker claim on others arising from 
disadvantage of the former type compared to that which arises from disadvantage of the latter type. 
In Scanlon’s terms, their risky choice renders them ‘substantively responsible’ for their 
disadvantage.1 The distinction between chosen risk and unchosen risk has been at the fore of 
debates about so-called ‘luck egalitarianism’. But the more general issue of the relationship between 
risky choice and substantive responsibility has much broader import.2 Regardless of one’s 
background view about the claims that disadvantaged agents have on others – whether egalitarian or 
otherwise – the question arises, how do prior risky choices bear on the strength of those claims?  
Call the view that claims normally associated with disadvantage are diminished or entirely 
voided by risky choices – that is, that agents are substantively responsible for disadvantage resulting 
from risky choices – ‘choice-based responsibilitarianism’. One of the most powerful early 
objections to choice-based responsibilitarianism was the charge that it is too harsh.3 According to 
the harshness objection, choice-based responsibilitarians would sometimes hold agents 
                                                 
1 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 248. Scanlon 
defines claims about substantive responsibility as expressing ‘substantive claims about what people are required (or […] 
not required) to do for each other.’ For a similar notion, Dworkin’s notion of ‘consequential responsibility, see Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
p. 287. 
2 There are also questions to be answered about substantive responsibility for disadvantage arising from non-risky 
choices, but my focus in the present article is on risky choices. 
3 E.g. Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics 109 (1999): 287–337 at 295-302; Samuel 
Scheffler, ‘What is Egalitarianism?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003): 5–39 at 18–19; Kristin Voigt, ‘The 
Harshness Objection: is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?’, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 10 (2007): 389-407. 
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substantively responsible for disadvantages resulting from chosen risks, even when it would seem 
intuitively wrong to do so. Consider the following examples. 
In a case discussed by Eyal, an agent chooses to continue living in her home in a county 
where earthquakes occur, albeit rarely. That she chooses to stay put rather than undertake a costly 
move to a county where earthquakes are even rarer does not seem to justify holding the agent 
substantively responsible for her disadvantage when an earthquake destroys her home.4 
 In a case described by Otsuka, agents face the risk of going blind or insane as a result of a 
horrible illness. Insurance is available, but is either unreasonably expensive, or offers only partial 
insurance against the potential loss. Regardless of how agents choose, the availability of such 
insurance and the fact of their choice does not seem to justify holding those agents who go blind or 
insane substantively responsible for their disadvantage.5 
In a case discussed by Vallentyne, an agent chooses to continue through a lightning storm 
and is struck by lightning. It seems irrelevant to the agent’s substantive responsibility for his 
disadvantage that he could instead have lain down, which, although reducing the risk of a lightning 
strike, would have been an unreasonable option in the circumstances.6 
                                                 
4 Nir Eyal, ‘Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (2007) 1-18 at 7. 
Eyal’s case is inspired by a similar example in Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 79. 
Eyal argues that his example is best explained not in terms of a reasonability condition, but in terms of the view that 
agents are not substantively responsible for disadvantages due to innocent choice. I agree with Shlomi Segall, Health, 
Luck, and Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 23-24, that Eyal’s criterion is too wide. 
5 Michael Otsuka, ‘Luck, Insurance, and Equality,’ Ethics 113 (2002): 40-54 at pp. 45-46. More precisely, Otsuka 
claims that we should not hold those agents who go blind or insane substantively responsible for all of their 
disadvantage. 
6 Peter Vallentyne, ‘Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities,’ Ethics 112 (2002): 529-57 at 
533. Vallentyne ends up rejecting the reasonability condition, and indeed the general framework for substantive 
responsibility within which the condition features, instead endorsing the view that equality of initial prospects is all that 
matters. 
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One way in which choice-based responsibilitarians have sought to respond to the harshness 
objection has been to argue that agents have a duty to ensure, when not too costly, that others have 
sufficiently good lives regardless of their own role in bringing about a disadvantage.7 But such a 
response offers only a partial response to the harshness objection, because the objection 
encompasses not only concerns about how badly off agents might end up in absolute terms, but also 
concerns about the background against which risky choices are made. In all of the above examples, 
the intuition is not just that the agent’s misfortune is somehow problematic, but that it is 
problematic because of the nature of the option set from which the agent chose. Suppose, for 
example, that the agent in Eyal’s case did not lose her home because of the earthquake, but instead 
suffered some lesser financial loss. According to this line of objection, it would be wrong for the 
agent’s claim for assistance from those who were not disadvantaged by the earthquake to be 
diminished by her choice, given the structure of the option set from which she chose. 
In order to accommodate this latter concern, choice-based responsibilitarians now 
commonly endorse the view that agents should be held substantively responsible for disadvantage 
arising from their risky choices only when the relevant choice was made from among a set of 
options that satisfies some version of a reasonability condition. Authors who have explicitly 
endorsed this view include Andersen, Elford, Knight, Otsuka, Sandbu, Segall, and Stemplowska. 8  
                                                 
7 E.g. Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice, pp. 68-72. In contrast, Zofia Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice Sensitive to 
Responsibility,’ Political Studies, 57 (2009): 237-59 at 251-54, argues that choice-based responsibilitarians need not 
endorse a sufficientarian threshold in order to respond to the objection. 
8 Gideon Elford, ‘Equality, Choice, and Alternatives: Why Reasonable Avoidability Matters,’ Ethical Perspectives 19 
(2012): 445-468; Martin Marchman Andersen, ‘Reasonable Avoidability, Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases’, 
Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012): 295-307 at 305; Carl Knight, ‘Inequality, Avoidability, and Healthcare’, Iyyun: The 
Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2011): 72-88 at 78-79; Otsuka, ‘Luck, Insurance, and Equality’; Michael Otsuka 
‘Equality, Ambition and Insurance’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (2004): 151–166; Martin E. 
Sandbu, ‘On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck–Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism,’ 
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 16 (2004): 283-312; Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice; Shlomi Segall, Equality 
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But to answer the harshness objection successfully, choice-based responsibilitarians are required not 
only to say when agents should be held substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from their 
risky choices, but also to explain why agents should be held substantively responsible for 
disadvantage arising from their risky choices in some circumstances but not others. Yet there has 
been surprisingly little discussion of the latter point. This has led to confusion about what the 
condition actually is; that is, about what the criterion for reasonableness ought to be, and about what 
it is that must be reasonable in order for the agent to be held substantively responsible for 
disadvantage arising from their risky choice. More problematically still, without such an 
explanation the reasonability condition remains open to the charge that it is an unjustified ad hoc 
technical fix which, as Seligman puts it, tries to defend choice-based responsibilitarianism against 
intuitive counterexamples by ‘gerrymandering the distinction [between choice and chance] to match 
our intuitions about justice’.9 Without principled support, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
such intuitions are founded on mistaken reasoning: that, when an explanation of why choice-based 
responsibilitarians have those first order intuitions is eventually supplied, it will not turn out to be a 
debunking one. Choice-based responsibilitarians should not therefore rest content with appeals to a 
reasonability condition until they have provided a convincing justification for doing so. The need to 
do so is not merely a matter of good book-keeping. Rather, the very survival of the view is at 
stake.10  
                                                                                                                                                                  
and Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 69-70; Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice Sensitive to 
Responsibility’. 
9 Matthew Seligman, ‘Luck, Leverage, and Equality: A Bargaining Problem for Luck Egalitarians,’ Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 35 (2007): 266-92 at 283. See also Daniel Weinstock, ‘Remarks on Shlomi Segall’s Health, Luck and 
Justice,’ Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012): 316-325 at 319. 
10 Would the problem highlighted be avoided if we were to endorse a desert-based conception rather than a choice-
based conception of substantive responsibility (e.g. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 59-62)? I doubt that it would, because what agents deserve does seem to depend, at least 
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In what follows I ask whether choice-based responsibilitarians can provide a justification for 
a reasonability condition, by examining three of the most promising candidates: an agent-
responsibility-based motivation, a voluntariness-based motivation, and what I call a ‘denied-claim’-
based motivation. I do not claim that the three motivations discussed exhaust the possible 
justifications for a reasonability condition, but I do claim that they are the most plausible.11 They 
are also the most strongly suggested, and in some cases explicitly endorsed, in the literature. In each 
case, I conclude that the putative motivation is not in fact capable of justifying a reasonability 
condition for substantive responsibility. I end with some comments on what this conclusion implies 
for the future of choice-based responsibilitarianism. 
 
II. AGENT RESPONSIBILITY 
 
It is sometimes said that choice bears on substantive responsibility because of a more fundamental 
concern with what I will call ‘agent responsibility’. Agent responsibility is simply about being in a 
sense the ‘author’ of an outcome.12 To be agent responsible for an outcome, two conditions must be 
                                                                                                                                                                  
sometimes, on what they choose. And on those occasions, similar intuitions about the relevance of the agent’s 
background option set to his substantive responsibility will be encountered. 
11 In discussing drafts of this paper, some readers have suggested that one or other of the putative motivations is the 
only plausible candidate, and that the others are not worthy of serious consideration. Yet readers who have made this 
suggestion have differed about which of the three putative motivations is the only plausible one. I therefore treat all 
three as worthy of serious consideration. 
12 See e.g. Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility,’ pp. 239-40; Zofia Stemplowska and Carl 
Knight, ‘Responsibility and Distributive Justice: An Introduction,’ pp. 1-23 in Zofia Stemplowska and Carl Knight, 
eds., Responsibility and Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at pp. 11-13. See also Peter 
Vallentyne, ‘Responsibility and False Beliefs’, pp. 174-86 in Zofia Stemplowska and Carl Knight, eds., Responsibility 
and Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Peter Vallentyne, ‘Brute Luck and Responsibility’, 
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satisfied. First, the agent must be causally responsible for the outcome. Second, the outcome must 
stem from an appropriate exercise of agency by the agent in question. There are different ways of 
fleshing out what this exercise of agency might look like. As Stemplowska and Knight write, it 
‘may be variously seen as a matter of what people choose as freely willing agents, or what they 
control, or deliberately choose, or choose when well-informed, or choose in the sense of responding 
to reasons, or choose in the absence of some autonomy-undermining conditions, or bring about 
absent mindedly when they should have paid attention, or bring about through forgetfulness, or 
some combination of those and similar proposals’.13 
Agent responsibility is a distinct notion from substantive responsibility, which is about the 
relevance of one’s role in bringing about a disadvantage to the strength of one’s claim against others 
arising from that disadvantage. It is also a distinct notion from blameworthiness, which unlike agent 
responsibility, implies some sort of moral wrongdoing, or at least some degree of recklessness or 
negligence. An agent can be agent responsible for an act such as opening a window, even if no 
blame (or praise) attaches to the act. Notice that the term ‘moral responsibility’ is sometimes used 
to refer to what I am here calling ‘agent responsibility’, but is also sometimes used to refer to what I 
am here calling ‘blameworthiness’. To avoid confusion, then, I shall avoid using the term ‘moral 
responsibility’ in the paper, instead using ‘agent responsibility’ and ‘blameworthiness’ to 
distinguish its two possible meanings. 
The claim made by the present view is that agent responsibility is a necessary condition for 
substantive responsibility.14 On this view, an agent is substantively responsible for the outcome of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Politics, Philosophy & Economics 7 (2008): 57-80 argues that agents should sometimes be held partially but not fully 
agent responsible for an outcome. 
13 Stemplowska and Knight, ‘Responsibility and Distributive Justice: An Introduction,’ p. 13. 
14 Some authors have thought that proponents of choice-based conceptions of substantive responsibility, particularly 
luck egalitarians, ought to be deeply troubled by the possibility that agent responsibility might be impossible, or at least 
very rare. This seems especially likely if one endorses a regression requirement for agent responsibility, according to 
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his risky choice only when his risky choice renders him agent responsible for the outcome. This 
suggests an obvious prima facie case for a reasonability condition, as follows. Where an agent could 
not reasonably have avoided choosing as she did, the link between choice and agent responsibility, 
and therefore the link between choice and substantive responsibility, is broken.15 So, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
which to be responsible for something one must be responsible for its causes. See, for example, Thomas Nagel, Mortal 
Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 35; Galen Strawson, ‘The Impossibility of Moral 
Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24; Gary Watson, ‘The Problematic Role of Responsibility in 
Contexts of Distributive Justice’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 425-32 at 428. I do not 
discuss the regression requirement herein, because it is only tangentially related to the present argument: one may either 
affirm or reject it consistently with P2. But suffice to say that there are at least three reasons why proponents of choice-
based conceptions of substantive responsibility need not be too worried. First, there are good reasons to doubt that agent 
responsibility does require a regression requirement (see e.g. Susan L. Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), ch. 3). Second, choice-based responsibilitarians need not be 
committed to the view that agent responsibility is necessary for substantive responsibility: choice itself, or 
voluntariness, for example, could do the work instead. Finally, even if agent responsibility is both necessary for 
substantive responsibility and impossible or rare, this just means that there is never or rarely a choice-based reason not 
to address disadvantage in the manner recommended by one’s background theory of justice, such as, in the case of luck 
egalitarianism, by fully remedying comparative disadvantage. This would not be such a damaging conclusion to 
endorse, and indeed would provide a strong response to the harshness objection outlined above (see Martin Marchman 
Andersen, Susanne Oksbjerg Dalton, Christoffer Johansen, John Lynch, Nils Holtug, ‘Social Inequality in Health, 
Responsibility and Egalitarian Justice’, Journal of Public Health 35 (2013): 4-8). 
15 Segall, who advocates a reasonable avoidability criterion for substantive responsibility, treats the reasonable 
avoidability criterion not as grounded in an agent-responsibility criterion for substantive responsibility, but, rather, as an 
alternative to an agent-responsibility criterion for substantive responsibility (Health, Luck, and Justice, p. 20; Equality 
and Opportunity, pp. 69-71). In this, Knight supports him, writing that, ‘While responsibility and avoidability come 
apart in some cases, it’s not prima facie implausible that it is in just those cases that luck egalitarianism should abandon 
responsibility’ (Knight, ‘Inequality, Avoidability, and Healthcare’, p. 78). As discussed above, the problem with simply 
asserting a reasonable avoidability condition for substantive responsibility without explaining the underlying ground for 
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the choice not to buy unreasonably expensive insurance in Otsuka’s example above cannot justify 
holding the agent substantively responsible for the subsequent disadvantage, because on this view 
the unreasonable expense of the insurance renders the agent not agent responsible for declining to 
purchase it. The argument can be summarised as follows: 
 
P1: Agent responsibility is necessary for substantive responsibility. 
P2: Reasonable avoidability is necessary for agent responsibility. 
C: Reasonable avoidability is necessary for substantive responsibility. 
 
The problem with the suggested argument is that, even if we grant P1, P2 is quite implausible, 
especially in the light of recent research on the conditions for blameworthiness. As just noted, 
blameworthiness is distinct from agent responsibility, and also from substantive responsibility, in 
that blameworthiness requires some sort of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, debates about 
blameworthiness bear on the present discussion, because agent responsibility is widely regarded as 
a necessary condition for blameworthiness (but not a sufficient condition – the wrongdoing 
component is also required). As such, if reasonable avoidability is not necessary for 
blameworthiness, then it cannot be necessary for agent responsibility as P2 claims. And there are 
reasons to think that a reasonable avoidability condition blameworthiness would face serious 
difficulties. 
To see why, recall Frankfurt’s famous case, and subsequent variations of it, in which an agent 
could not apparently have done otherwise. In such cases, had the agent been about to choose a 
different option to the option that he in fact chose, he would have been compelled to choose the 
option that he in fact chose by some form of external intervention.16 Many have been inclined to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the condition is that such an approach leaves open the possibility that the best explanation of the intuitions thought to 
support the condition is, in fact, a debunking one.  
16 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 829–39. 
 10 
agree with Frankfurt that the agent in such cases is intuitively blameworthy and agent responsible 
for choosing the option, even though he could not have done otherwise, reasonably or otherwise. As 
such, many have concluded that Frankfurt-type cases show that so-called ‘alternate sequence’ 
requirements for blameworthiness and agent responsibility are false. Such conditions include both 
the present reasonable avoidability condition and the original, more widely discussed, ‘Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities’ (PAP) requirement, according to which blameworthiness and agent 
responsibility simply require the ability to do otherwise, whether reasonably or not. In their place, 
and against P2, these authors argue, we should instead endorse ‘actual sequence’ requirements for 
blameworthiness and agent responsibility that focus not on what might have happened but on what 
actually happened, on the actual causes of the agent’s choice, such as the cognitive mechanism that 
brought about their choice.17 
Not everyone endorses the Frankurtian intuition. But the fact that so many philosophers do 
endorse the intuition puts pressure on proponents of alternate sequence accounts of 
blameworthiness to defend their view in a way that does not treat the agent as devoid of blame in 
Frankfurtian cases. Two defences in particular have received particular attention, and may seem to 
offer ways to rescue a reasonability condition for agent responsibility from Frankfurt-inspired 
objections. 
                                                 
17 E.g. Susan L. Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 54-
79; Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’; Martha Klein, Determinism, Blameworthiness and 
Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990); John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); John 
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Blameworthiness (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press: 1998); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ‘Hurley on Reason-Responsiveness, Regression, and 
Responsibility’, Philosophical Books 46 (2005): 199-209 at 201-04. 
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The first of these responses is the so-called ‘flickers of freedom’ defence.18 According to this 
defence, agents in Frankfurt cases do enjoy a minimal freedom of the will, to be compelled to 
choose a particular option rather than to choose that option without compulsion. They cannot 
choose a different option, but they can exercise control over how they will come to choose it. This 
minimal freedom of the will is said to suffice for blameworthiness and agent responsibility: they are 
blameworthy not for doing what they did, but for doing what they did on their own, without 
compulsion.  
Can the flickers of freedom defence rescue a reasonable avoidability condition for agent 
responsibility from Frankfurt-inspired objections? I think that we must conclude that it cannot. The 
problem is that the flickers defence succeeds only as a defence of an especially weak reading of 
PAP, according to which a sufficient condition for blameworthiness and agent responsibility is that 
an agent was able to exercise control over how he came to choose an option. It is not compatible 
with a stronger alternate sequence requirement, such as reasonable avoidability, according to which 
a necessary condition for blameworthiness and agent responsibility is that the agent had a genuine 
alternative with a different outcome that he could actually have chosen. This is because the response 
aims to defend a less exposed position precisely by ceding the core target of the Frankfurt intuition, 
viz, the claim that blameworthiness and agent responsibility require the presence of a genuine 
alternative with a different outcome that the agent could actually choose. But by doing so it renders 
itself incompatible with a reasonable avoidability condition for agent responsibility, which endorses 
that core target. 
A second response to Frankfurt cases is Otsuka’s Principle of Avoidable Blame (PAB).19 
According to PAB, an agent is blameworthy if she could instead have behaved in such a way that 
                                                 
18 See Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 134ff, and many subsequent discussions. 
19 Michael Otsuka, ‘Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame’, Ethics 108 (1998): 685–701. There are reasons 
to doubt PAB. For one thing, those who, against Otsuka, maintain the possibility of what Nagel calls ‘moral blind 
alleys’, deny that it is always possible to avoid blame entirely by behaving least badly in comparison with one’s other 
 12 
would have left her entirely blameless, by choosing the least morally bad option available to her. 
Like PAP, PAB is an alternate sequence requirement for blameworthiness. But unlike PAP, PAB 
accommodates Frankfurt cases without invoking the flickers of freedom defence. PAB claims that 
agents are blameworthy in Frankfurt cases because they could instead have behaved in a blameless 
fashion, by bringing it about that they were compelled to choose the option that they in fact chose 
without compulsion. 
Is PAB consistent with P2? If we are willing to adopt a very particular interpretation of 
reasonable avoidability, in terms of ability to choose a less morally bad option, then we might 
indeed treat PAB as consistent with P2. But while PAB is consistent with (this interpretation of) P2, 
it is also consistent with the rejection of P2. Agent responsibility may be necessary for 
blameworthiness, but it is certainly not sufficient for it, at least not if blameworthiness is understood 
in the standard moralised sense described above. As such, even if the ability to choose a less 
morally bad option is a necessary condition for blameworthiness, it does not follow that the ability 
to choose a less morally bad option must also be a necessary condition for agent responsibility (and 
therefore for substantive responsibility).20 Moreover, it is not plausible that the ability to choose a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
options. (Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 123– 44 at 143– 44; Otsuka 
argues that there are no moral blind alleys on pp. 698-701.) For another, Hurley has argued that, in cases where an agent 
would not have chosen a blameless alternate sequence to the sequence that he in fact chose, it is irrelevant to his 
blameworthiness whether or not the blameless alternate sequence was in fact available to him (Justice, Luck, and 
Knowledge, pp. 76-78). In what follows I set aside these objections to ask: if one were to endorse PAB as a criterion for 
blameworthiness, how would this bear on the plausibility or otherwise of P2? 
20  Might one argue nevertheless that if it is a necessary condition for blameworthiness that a person had a less morally 
bad alternative, this would provide a prima facie reason to think that a similar condition also applies to substantive 
responsibility, even if not to agent responsibility? The problem with this argument is that it supposes that the further 
conditions for blameworthiness and substantive responsibility, in addition to the common requirement for agent 
responsibility, are likely to be similar. Yet the argument provides no justification for such a supposition. 
Blameworthiness is not a necessary condition for substantive responsibility. One might, for example, believe that agents 
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less morally bad option could be a necessary condition for agent responsibility. For consider, first, 
that the formulation speaks only to contexts in which agents must choose between options that have 
a moral valence: in non-moral contexts the putative criterion would fail to distinguish between 
outcomes for which agents are agent responsible and those for which they are not. Yet we clearly do 
make such distinctions. Second, consider that, unlike those who defend PAP, it is never Otsuka’s 
intention to argue that PAB provides a condition not only for blameworthiness but also for agent 
responsibility. Indeed, the examples that he uses to illustrate the appeal of PAB as a condition for 
blameworthiness at the same time serve to illustrate why it would be implausible to regard PAB as a 
condition for agent responsibility. To take one such example, Otsuka writes of the standard trolley 
‘switch’ case that, if he were to flick the switch to kill one and save five, then ‘If I were to come 
across the grief-stricken family of the one whom I killed, I am fairly certain that I would suffer 
feelings of guilt that would survive the thought that what I did was perfectly justifiable’.21 Quite 
rightly, Otsuka acknowledges that he would be agent responsible for the death of the one, even if, 
according to PAB, the lack of a less morally bad option means that he would be blameless for the 
death. This implies that Otsuka’s view of agent responsibility does not, like his view of 
blameworthiness, include the avoidability condition. His argument for PAB, then, provides no 
support for P2. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
who participate in risky speleological expeditions are substantively responsibility for the cost of any rescue that they 
require (which needn’t preclude them from taking out private insurance), rather than having the costs met from the 
public purse. But one needn’t also believe that, if they are substantively responsible in this way, then they must also be 
blameworthy for participating in the expedition, since they needn’t have done anything morally wrong by participating. 
Any movement from the conditions for moral responsibility to the conditions for substantive responsibility, without 
further justification, is therefore purely speculative. This is not enough to provide a response to the gerrymandering 
objection, which requires that we provide an account of the underlying principles that justify a reasonability condition 
for substantive responsibility. 
21 Otsuka, ‘Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame’, p. 699. Italics added. 
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Our interim conclusion is as follows. It may or may not be the case that choice bears on 
substantive responsibility only because choice reflects a more fundamental concern with agent 
responsibility. But even if it is the case, the concern with agent responsibility provides no ground 
for the claim that agents are substantively responsible only when they choose in the presence of a 
reasonable alternative. This is because the presence of a reasonable alternative cannot, for the 
reasons given, plausibly be thought to be a requirement for agent responsibility. It does not follow 
that the presence of a reasonable alternative could not be a requirement for substantive 
responsibility, but it does follow that we are still without the required justification for its being so. 
 
III. VOLUNTARINESS 
 
An appeal to agent responsibility provides no ground for a reasonability condition for substantive 
responsibility. But perhaps the concern with choice is not, in any case, best explained in terms of a 
more fundamental concern with agent responsibility. Perhaps it should instead be explained in terms 
of a more fundamental concern with voluntariness, where voluntariness is not merely a matter of 
choosing a particular option, but of being motivated to choose a particular option in the right sort of 
way, or for the right sort of reasons.22 If so, then we might suppose that the intuitions that have been 
thought to support a reasonability condition reflect the fact that voluntariness, not agent 
responsibility, requires the satisfaction of a reasonability condition. Just such a claim has been made 
by Serena Olsaretti, who argues that voluntariness (or, at least, that the type of voluntariness that 
                                                 
22 Such a conception of voluntariness is different to, and need not be regarded as necessary for, agent responsibility. 
The latter, unlike the former, is not commonly thought to require that the agent acted on particular motivations but 
merely that they were able, in some sense, to act otherwise (on an alternate-sequence account), or that they acted on the 
basis of something like a particular cognitive mechanism or similar (on an actual-sequence account). As I note below, 
Olsaretti, on whose account of voluntariness I focus, thinks that her concept of voluntariness is not necessary for agent 
responsibility. 
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she regards as necessary for substantive responsibility, but not for agent responsibility) requires that 
an agent not be motivated by the absence of a reasonable alternative.23 ‘A choice is voluntary’, 
Olsaretti writes, ‘if and only if it is not made because there is no acceptable alternative to it’.24 
One problem with the voluntariness-based argument for a reasonability condition is that, as 
Olsaretti herself notes, her intuitions about voluntariness are very much guided by her intuitions 
about substantive responsibility in particular cases. She describes her account of voluntariness as a 
specification of a necessary condition for substantive responsibility, rather than as an explanation of 
her intuitions or a justification for the condition.25 She is right to do so: if her notion of 
voluntariness is tailored to match her intuitions about substantive responsibility, then any attempt to 
read the account as an explanation or justification for a reasonability condition for substantive 
responsibility would be entirely question begging. But to answer the gerrymandering objection, we 
need to justify the condition, by showing that we can motivate it by reference to underlying 
principles that have intuitive purchase independently of intuitions about substantive responsibility. 
To do otherwise is merely to repeat that there is an intuitive case for the condition based on 
particular cases, but not to demonstrate that those intuitions are well-founded. 
Second, there are strong reasons to doubt Olsaretti’s claim that the stated criterion provides a 
necessary condition for voluntariness. Olsaretti provides two accounts of what it means not to be 
motivated by the absence of a reasonable alternative. The first formulation claims that the agent 
                                                 
23 Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 139-40 
& 154-60. Olsaretti does not actually say that her concept of voluntariness is not necessary for agent responsibility, but 
only that it is not necessary for moral responsibility (p. 159), although she grants that some other concept of 
voluntariness could be necessary for moral responsibility. Since agent responsibility appears necessary for moral 
responsibility, however, it is reasonable to infer that Olsaretti would not think her concept of voluntariness necessary for 
agent responsibility. 
24 Liberty, Desert and the Market, p. 139. 
25 Liberty, Desert and the Market, p. 160. 
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must choose an option because she finds it ‘very attractive or choiceworthy’.26 This formulation 
does not provide a plausible condition for voluntariness. For one thing, it is clear that we would 
often want to treat an agent’s risky choice as voluntary even if she finds the option that she chooses 
merely reasonably good, but not good enough to be ‘very attractive’. But even if we drop the bar 
and suppose instead that voluntary choice merely requires that the agent find the option reasonably 
good, the first criterion still looks contentious, at least on any non-stipulative account of 
voluntariness. In support of this claim, consider Eyal’s example above, in which an agent chooses to 
continue living in her home in a county where earthquakes occur, albeit rarely, rather than 
undertake a costly move to a county in which earthquakes are even rarer. Assuming that the option 
to move would, under the circumstances, be unreasonable, Olsaretti’s first criterion would claim 
that the choice was voluntary, only if the agent found the option to continue living in her home 
reasonably good. But notice that, in order even to decide whether or not she regarded the option to 
continue living in her home reasonably good, the agent would have needed to have engaged in a 
deliberative process by which she would have assessed the merits of the option. The fact that this 
deliberative process occurred and that the agent acted on the basis of its conclusion will for many be 
enough to cast doubt on Olsaretti’s claim that the choice was involuntary. This is because the notion 
of involuntary choice – as compared, for example, with a notion of constrained choice – suggests a 
lack of freedom to engage in such deliberation, or at least a lack of freedom to act on its conclusion. 
Moreover, even if the fact of her deliberation is not enough to be certain that her choice to continue 
living in her home was voluntary, nevertheless the types of condition that have commonly been 
thought to defeat voluntariness under such circumstances make no reference to whether or not the 
agent concluded that the alternative was reasonably good. Rather, they have been thought to include 
such conditions as the presence of duress (understood as involving the agency or threatened agency 
                                                 
26 Liberty, Desert and the Market, p. 139, n. 3 and p. 155. 
 17 
of others, not merely background circumstance), or the presence of external manipulation or control 
over the deliberation that led to the choice.27 
It is doubtful, then, whether Olsaretti’s first criterion really does capture basic intuitions about 
voluntariness. More problematically still, regardless of its relation to voluntariness, the criterion 
fails to provide a plausible condition for substantive responsibility. Consider again Eyal’s 
earthquake victim. As Eyal points out, it is intuitive that victims of bad luck in situations like that 
which he describes are not substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from their risky 
choices, and so should be given assistance when their home is destroyed by an earthquake.28 Yet 
Olsaretti’s first criterion would give us the wrong result in this case. Since the agent did, ex 
hypothesi, find the option to remain in the low-but-not-negligible-risk earthquake zone reasonably 
good, Olsaretti’s criterion would have us hold the agent substantively responsible for the outcome 
of her risky choice. Olsaretti’s first criterion therefore fails to give proponents of a choice-based 
conception of substantive responsibility that which they need in order to accommodate the 
counterintuitive consequences of their view. 
                                                 
27 E.g. H. L.A. Hart and Anthony Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 1985), p.157. Olsaretti, 
Liberty, Desert and the Market, pp. 159-61 suggests that we might distinguish between two conceptions of 
voluntariness, one of which specifies a necessary condition for substantive responsibility, the other of which specifies a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility (where moral responsibility is akin to blameworthiness rather than agent 
responsibility, along the lines of the distinction discussed above). She could therefore respond that duress and external 
manipulation or control are relevant to the latter, but not to the former. The difficulty with this response is that, as noted 
above, Olsaretti fails to demonstrate that the former of her putative conceptions of voluntariness, that which specifies 
conditions for substantive responsibility, can be supported by intuitions about voluntariness which have force 
independently of intuitions about substantive responsibility. Against this background, her endorsement of a second 
conception of voluntariness only serves to reinforce the suspicion that the first is entirely stipulative. 
28 Eyal, ‘Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice,’ p. 5. 
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Olsaretti’s second criterion claims that a choice is voluntary only if the agent would have 
chosen the option that she did even if she had had a reasonable alternative.29 The problem with this 
formulation is that it is entirely indeterminate what the reasonable alternative, about which we are to 
enquire, should be.30 The agent might have chosen some reasonable alternatives over the option that 
she chose, but she might not have chosen other reasonable alternatives over the option that she 
chose. We are given no grounds to distinguish between hypothetical reasonable alternatives that are 
relevant and those that are not. Nor can we read the formulation as saying that a choice is voluntary 
if and only if the agent would not have chosen any imaginable reasonable alternative over the 
option that she chose. Such a reading would generate the implausible conclusion that no-one is ever 
responsible for anything, because we can always imagine a reasonable alternative so much better 
than the chosen option, such that the agent would have chosen it over the option that she in fact 
chose. 
 
IV. DENIED CLAIM VIEWS 
 
Consider, finally, a class of motivation for a reasonability condition that has been endorsed by 
Otsuka, Stemplowska, and, on Lippert-Rasmussen’s reading, by Ronald Dworkin.31 Each of these 
                                                 
29 Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market, p. 139, n. 3. Olsaretti suggests that we should use this criterion to settle 
the question of voluntariness only when an agent acts from mixed motives: when she acts both because she finds the 
option that she chooses very attractive or choiceworthy, and because she lacks a reasonable alternative. The 
indeterminacy objection applies whether one uses the criterion in all cases, or only in mixed motive cases. 
30 C.f. Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, p. 29, who discusses a similar problem for hypothetical choice accounts 
of agent responsibility. 
31 Otsuka, ‘Luck, Insurance, and Equality’; Otsuka, ‘Equality, Ambition and Insurance’; Stemplowska, ‘Making 
Justice Sensitive to Responsibility’; Zofia Stemplowska, ‘Harmful Choices: Scanlon and Voorhoeve on Substantive 
Responsibility, Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013): 488-507; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, ‘Egalitarianism, Option 
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authors provides a slightly different case for a reasonability condition and, as a result, each endorses 
a different version of the condition. But all of the authors share in common the view that agents 
have a legitimate moral claim to a reasonable option or options, and that agents who are 
disadvantaged by risky choices that they make in the absence of such options are not substantively 
responsible for at least some of that disadvantage.32 The view that Lippert-Rasmussen attributes to 
Dworkin, a view that Lippert-Rasmussen calls the ‘Revised Sufficiency View’, is perhaps the 
clearest example of this type of motivation. On the Revised Sufficiency View, agents ought to have 
the opportunity to achieve a sufficiently good outcome for certain. In Lippert-Rasmussen’s terms, 
they ought have a ‘Reasonable, Guaranteed Minimum’. If an agent does not have such an option, 
then he ought not be held substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from his risky choice.33 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Luck, and Responsibility,’ Ethics 111 (2001): 548-579 at 557-62. I merely note herein that Lippert-Rasmussen 
attributes a view of this type to Dworkin: I make no claim about whether or not Dworkin in fact held such a view. 
Another view which I do not discuss here, but which shares certain key features with Stemplowska’s view, and which is 
subject to the same objections, is Gerald Lang, ‘Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard’, 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 317-338. According to Lang, agents have a claim to social insurance against 
certain risks, provided that such insurance would not cause unreasonable degrees of moral hazard. 
32 Unless they are substantively responsible for having placed themselves in a situation in which they lack such an 
option or options. Note that the language of claims is dispensable, and indeed is not always used by the authors 
discussed. What really matters to denied claim views is that there is some sense in which agents ought to have a 
reasonable option or options. 
33 Lippert-Rasumussen (‘Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,’ pp. 561-62) rejects the requirement that he 
attributes to Dworkin on the following two grounds. First, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the revised sufficiency view 
cannot explain why we should treat the disadvantage as bad, rather than the situation in which the agent finds himself as 
a result of his choice, whether disadvantageous or not. This is because the revised sufficiency view has nothing to say 
about disadvantage, but only about sufficiency. Second, Lippert-Rasmussen objects, it seems ad hoc to suppose that 
minor differences in the value of an agent’s options, when such differences occur across the line between sufficiency 
and insufficiency, could lead to disproportionately large differences in judgements about substantive responsibility. Yet 
I think that there are ready responses to both these objections. In response to the second objection, we might suppose 
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Otsuka also claims that agents who face risky options have a claim to a safe, non-risky option that 
meets some minimum threshold for sufficiency. In addition, however, Otsuka claims that the safe 
option to which agents have a claim should be sufficiently good relative to the risky option such 
that it would not be reasonable to reject the safe option in favour of the risky option. When an agent 
does not have such an option, Otsuka claims, then he is not substantively responsible for 
disadvantage arising from his risky choice.34 Stemplowska’s view is different again: Stemplowska 
argues that each agent has a claim to an option or options that are reasonable not merely by 
reference to the agent’s own interests, but by reference both to the agent’s own interests and to the 
interests of other agents, who would pay the cost of providing the agent with the relevant option.35 
Specifically, Stemplowska argues that agents have a claim to indemnity against any risk that they 
may choose to face if and only if the interest that they have in being indemnified against the risk 
outweighs the interest that other agents have in not offering such an indemnity. 
In each of the above cases, the nature of the reasonable option or options to which agents are 
said to have a claim is slightly different, as is the background story about why agents have such a 
claim. Both Otsuka and Stemplowska describe their views as grounded in egalitarian concerns, 
whereas Lippert-Rasmussen describes the Reasonable, Guaranteed Minimum Requirement as 
grounded in sufficientarian concerns. But, crucially, all of the above views have in common the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
that an agent’s substantive responsibility depends on the extent to which the options fell short of guaranteeing a 
reasonably good outcome, thereby removing the sharp line between options that clear a threshold and options that fail to 
clear a threshold. And in response to the first objection, we can respond that the objection makes an unwarranted leap 
from the claim that the revised sufficiency view does not include or entail a concern with disadvantage, to the claim that 
the revised sufficiency view gives us no reason at all to be concerned about disadvantage. The former is true, the latter 
is more contentious, for the reasons given below. 
34 Otsuka, ‘Equality, Ambition and Insurance’, pp. 155-56 (see also Otsuka, ‘Luck, Insurance, and Equality’). 
35 Stemplowska’s view allows for claims to multiple options, depending on the balance of interests. The views 
discussed by Otsuka and Lippert-Rasmussen suggest that the claim will be to just one option.  
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claim that, when agents do not enjoy an option or options to which they have a claim, they are not 
substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from their risky choices. Call views of this type, 
denied claim views. Denied claim views seek to explain the intuitions with which I opened this 
paper by arguing that: 
 
(1) Agents have a claim to an option or options that are reasonable in a specified sense. 
(2) When an agent’s claim under (1) is not satisfied, such that the agent was denied a 
reasonable alternative to the option that he chose, the agent is not substantively 
responsible for disadvantage that he suffers as a result of his risky choice. 
 
All denied claim views endorse some version of both (1) and (2). The two commitments are, 
however, separable, in that one could consistently endorse (1) without also endorsing (2). (1) tells 
us that the agent in question had a claim to a reasonable option of a specified type, but it does not 
tell us what to think if the agent’s claim to such an option was not satisfied. One could suppose that 
agents are not substantively responsible for disadvantage suffered as a result of their risky choice 
under such circumstances. But this claim would be a further, separate commitment, not entailed by 
(1) itself. Nevertheless, one might reasonably insist that, while (1) does not itself require us to 
endorse (2), it does at least strongly suggest that we should do so. If agents have a claim to an 
option that is reasonable in a specified sense then, one might reasonably argue, surely something 
should follow if their claim is not met: otherwise, their claim looks like an unusually weak, 
inconsequential sort of claim. Moreover, we tend to think that, in general, the correct way to remedy 
past wrongs is to remedy their deleterious effects. So (goes the argument) on those occasions when 
an agent chooses in the absence of an option to which he has a claim, it would be quite appropriate 
not to hold him substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from that choice. Those who 
endorse denied claims views do not always make this reasoning explicit as the ground for their 
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moving from (1) to (2), but in the absence of any alternative account it is reasonable to think that 
some implicit commitment to something like this account must underlie the move.36 
Consider the following objection to denied claim views, which I will call the objection from 
hypothetical choice. The objection begins by noting that, when an agent did not have a reasonable 
option to which he had a claim, but would in any case have declined such an option in favour of the 
risky option that he chose, then the same outcome would have eventuated even if the reasonable 
option had been present. As such, claims the objection, the fact that the agent did not have the 
reasonable option should have no bearing on the agent’s substantive responsibility for the 
outcome.37 The objection can be illustrated by an example given by Richard Arneson, albeit that 
Arneson himself intends the example to illustrate a slightly different point.38 Arneson writes that, ‘If 
                                                 
36 Proponents of denied claim views must endorse some ground for moving from (1) to (2), because (2) does not 
straightforwardly follow from (1) alone. For example, in the absence of such a ground, the denied claim view that 
Lippert-Rasmussen attributes to Dworkin would be vulnerable to the first of Lippert-Rasmussen’s objections described 
in n. 33 above.  
37 This objection resembles Hurley’s ‘irrelevant alternative’ objection to alternate sequence requirements for agent 
responsibility, according to which it is irrelevant to agent responsibility whether or not an agent was able to do 
otherwise, if she would not have done otherwise (Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, pp.61-66). But the objections are 
nevertheless quite distinct. Whereas Hurley’s objection concerns agent responsibility, the present objection concerns 
substantive responsibility, and does not rely on Hurley’s claims about agent responsibility for its force. 
38 Richard J. Arneson, ‘Does Social Justice Matter? Brian Barry’s Applied Political Philosophy’, Ethics 117 (2007): 
391–412 at 399. Arneson himself does not intend his example to illustrate the present objection from hypothetical 
choice, which is an objection to the claim that the absence of a reasonable alternative suffices to waive substantively 
responsibility. Rather, he intends his example to illustrate a similar objection to the different claim that the absence of 
equality of options suffices to waive substantive responsibility. The equality of options condition and the reasonable 
alternative condition for substantive responsibility are both commonly endorsed by choice-sensitive egalitarians. 
Nevertheless, it is important to the present argument to recognise that they are conceptually distinct. Equality of options 
is a comparative criterion, whereas reasonableness is a non-comparative criterion. 
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I was bound and determined not to take an umbrella to the picnic in any case, my claim to 
compensation from society due to losses I suffer when rain spoils my picnic is not enhanced if in 
fact there was no umbrella available for me to take, given that the umbrella option would have had 
no impact on events in any case.’ 
The objection from hypothetical choice poses a powerful challenge to denied claim views, not 
only because it resonates at the intuitive level, but also because it undermines the story about why 
(2) is an appropriate response to the denial of claims under (1). As outlined above, the case for (2) 
relies on the thought that we should waive substantive responsibility for disadvantage in cases 
where agents are denied the option to which they have a claim under (1), because we ought remedy 
the deleterious effects of past wrongs. But if an agent would not have chosen the option to which he 
has a claim under (1), then any subsequent disadvantage that he suffers as a result of his making a 
risky choice does not result from the denial of his claim under (1), and so cannot be regarded as a 
deleterious effect of the denial of his claim. In such cases, the justification for moving from (1) to 
(2) is therefore undermined. 
How might a proponent of a denied claim view respond to the objection from hypothetical 
choice? One thing they might say is that the objection from hypothetical choice assumes that what 
matters to substantive responsibility is what is sometimes called counterfactual causation: whether 
the same outcome would have eventuated in a hypothetical world in which there was a reasonable 
alternative. They might reject this assumption and instead invoke an actual-sequence account of 
causation, according to which what matters to substantive responsibility is whether the absence of a 
reasonable alternative played a role in the actual sequence of events that generated the outcome. On 
an actual-sequence account, it might seem that the agent’s choice and subsequent disadvantage was 
overdetermined: it was caused both by his preference for the option and by the absence of a 
reasonable alternative. 
Yet this response looks unlikely to succeed. For one thing, while the objection from 
hypothetical choice does indeed invoke a counterfactual account of causation, there are nevertheless 
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good reasons for adopting a counterfactual account of causation over an actual-sequence account in 
this case. One might, for example, point to the predominant use of counterfactual causation in 
matters of criminal and civil law to support the use of such a standard in the case of judgements 
about substantive responsibility.39 If what appears salient to us in matters of criminal and civil law 
is what would have happened otherwise, then, in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, 
which the putative objection does not supply, we might reasonably suppose that counterfactual 
causation is also what matters to substantive responsibility. More damagingly still, however, is that 
it is well recognised that, while counterfactual accounts of causation can easily make sense of the 
claim that the absence of something can serve as a cause, it is much more difficult and perhaps 
impossible for actual-sequence accounts of causation to make sense of such a claim.40 Yet what is at 
stake in the present argument is precisely whether or not the absence of a reasonable alternative was 
a cause of the agent’s disadvantage. A reply to the objection from hypothetical choice that appeals 
to an actual-sequence account of causation therefore looks in danger of simply leaping from the 
frying pan into the fire, replacing the conclusion that the lack of a reasonable alternative did not in 
fact bring about the disadvantage with the conclusion that the lack of a reasonable alternative could 
not possibly have brought about the disadvantage. 
A second response to the objection from hypothetical choice is as follows. The objection from 
hypothetical choice claims that the absence of a reasonable alternative makes no difference to the 
outcome when the agent would not have chosen it, and so should make no difference to substantive 
responsibility. But the absence of a reasonable alternative could make a difference to substantive 
responsibility not because it affected the outcome, but for some other reason. In particular, as noted, 
many of the proponents of a reasonable avoidability condition for substantive responsibility have 
                                                 
39 See e.g. Jane Stapleton, ‘Causation in the Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, ed. by Helen Beebee, 
Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 744-769 at p. 747. 
40 See e.g. L. A. Paul, ‘Counterfactual Theories’, in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, ed. by Helen Beebee, 
Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 158-184 at pp. 168-169. 
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been luck egalitarians. Such proponents might therefore claim that the absence of a reasonable 
alternative can make a difference to substantive responsibility if and because the absence of a 
reasonable alternative meant that the agent lacked a reasonable option to which other agents had 
access, regardless of whether or not it would have been chosen.41 On this view, the inequality of 
options which thereby obtains between agents, either in itself or as an indicator of some deeper 
inequality such as inequality in Razian autonomy,42 provides a reason not to hold the comparatively 
disadvantaged agent substantively responsible for the outcome of his choice. 
What should we make of this response to the objection from hypothetical choice? For one 
thing, it relies on an appeal to equality of options, and therefore speaks only to those proponents of 
a choice-based conception of substantive responsibility who also endorse egalitarian commitments. 
But even on its own terms, the putative response does not succeed. The most straightforward way to 
demonstrate this is to note that it offers no response at all in cases where all agents lack a 
reasonable option to which they have a claim. Suppose, for example, that all agents at Arneson’s 
picnic lacked umbrellas, that all faced an equal chance of being rained on, and that half got rained 
on whilst the other half stayed dry. Are those agents who get rained on substantively responsible for 
their comparative misfortune? Here the objection from hypothetical choice will deny what (2) 
affirms, viz, that we should waive substantive responsibility even for those agents who would not 
                                                 
41 Most luck egalitarians do treat equality of options as a prerequisite for the claims that they make about the 
conditions under which agents are substantively responsible for disadvantage suffered as a result of their risky choices. 
E.g. Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility, pp. 238 & 243-44; Richard Arneson, ‘Equality and 
Equal Opportunity for Welfare’, Philosophical Studies, 56 (1989): 77-93 at 85-86; Vallentyne, ‘Brute Luck, Option 
Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities’, p. 542; Lippert-Rasmussen, ‘Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and 
Responsibility’, pp. 564-65; Otsuka ‘Equality, Ambition and Insurance’, p. 153 n. 9. For a more nuanced view, 
according to which inequality of risks matters to fairness only when pursuant to prudent conduct and when resulting in 
unequal outcomes, see Segall, Equality and Opportunity, pp. 64-82. 
42 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 155 & 204. Raz claims that  
autonomy depends in part on the availability of a variety of acceptable options. 
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have chosen to take an umbrella to the picnic, simply because they lacked a reasonable option. And 
in such cases there will be nothing that the putative response can say, by appeal to inequality of 
options or autonomy, in defence of the claim that we should waive substantive responsibility.  
More generally, the problem with the putative response is that, in order to defeat (2), the 
objection from hypothetical choice need only claim that the absence of a reasonable option does not 
itself provide sufficient reason to waive substantive responsibility. It need not claim that, in the 
absence of a reasonable option, if the agent would not have chosen the reasonable option, then we 
must hold the agent substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from his choice. As such, the 
objection is compatible with the thought that, even where the agent would not have chosen the 
reasonable option, there might nevertheless be other reasons – such as inequality of options or 
autonomy – why the agent is not substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from his choice. 
In Arneson’s example, it suffices to defeat (2) that the lack of an umbrella does not, qua absence of 
a reasonable option to which the agent has a claim, automatically provide a reason to waive 
substantive responsibility. It is a further question, the answer to which is independent of (2), 
whether or not the lack of an umbrella, qua option that would have put the agent on an equal 
footing with other agents, provides a reason to waive substantive responsibility.43 We should 
therefore conclude that the putative response to the objection to hypothetical choice does not 
succeed in defending denied claim views against the objection. 
                                                 
43 As noted in n. 38 above, Arneson himself deploys a similar hypothetical choice objection to the claim that 
inequality of options suffices to waive substantive responsibility. It seems likely that if we should endorse the present 
hypothetical choice objection to a reasonable alternative condition for substantive responsibility, then we should for 
much the same reasons also endorse Arneson’s hypothetical choice objection to an equality of options condition for 
substantive responsibility. If so, then the putative response considered herein can be rejected not only on the ground that 
it confounds the two conditions, but also on the ground that it wrongly claims that inequality of options suffices to 
waive substantive responsibility. 
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Finally, a proponent of a denied claim view might attempt to accommodate the objection from 
hypothetical choice, and thereby rescue their view, by replacing (2) with the following modified 
claim: 
 
(2*) When an agent’s claim under (1) is not satisfied, such that the agent was denied a 
reasonable alternative to the option that she chose, then the agent is not substantively 
responsible for disadvantage that she suffers as a result of her risky choice, provided 
that the agent would have chosen the reasonable alternative to which she had a claim 
under (1) over the option that she chose, had the reasonable alternative been available 
to her.  
 
The difficulty with the proposed new formulation (2*) is that it runs into exactly the same 
indeterminacy problem that, as we saw above, Olsaretti’s second criterion for voluntariness also 
runs into. There are various hypothetical reasonable options that would satisfy an agent’s claim 
under (1), some of which the agent might have chosen over the option that she chose, others of 
which she would not have chosen over the option that she chose. It is therefore an indeterminate 
matter whether or not (2*) will be satisfied in any particular case, such that (2*) cannot provide a 
useful way to defend denied claim views against the objection from hypothetical choice. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that a reasonability condition for substantive responsibility cannot be justified by any 
of the most plausible candidates: an appeal to agent responsibility, voluntariness, or a denied claim 
view. At the same time, choice-based responsibilitarians are still left with the challenge of 
explaining why, intuitively, agents do not seem to be substantively responsible for the disadvantage 
arising from risky choices in examples such as those with which I opened this paper. One 
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possibility is that these intuitions are grounded in the mistaken belief that an underlying 
commitment to agent responsibility, voluntariness, or a denied claim view requires a reasonability 
condition. If so, then the argument of this paper could be read as a debunking argument, one which 
shows that choice-based responsibilitarians should reject these intuitions and willingly endorse the 
view that agents should be held substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from all their 
risky choices, at least provided that they were not coerced.44 Rakowski comes closest to endorsing 
such a view, but most have found it unpalatable.45 Another way to read the paper is as exposing the 
reasonability condition as precisely the sort of unjustified ad hoc gerrymandering that opponents of 
choice-based responsibilitarianism charge that it is. We should, according to this reading, conclude 
that the intuitions adduced by the stated examples ought actually be treated as grounds to reject 
choice-based responsibilitarianism altogether. 
It remains possible, of course, that egalitarians might ground a reasonability condition in 
some further commitment not discussed in the present paper. But until such a justification is 
provided, choice-based responsibilitarians should not assume that they can accommodate intuitive 
counterexamples by endorsing a reasonability condition. To avoid the threat posed by such cases, 
without encountering the charge of gerrymandering, they must provide a justification for the 
                                                 
44 Some might add: and any background claims to relevant information were met (e.g. Alex Voorhoeve, ‘Scanlon on 
Substantive Responsibility’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 184–200. Egalitarians might add: and they 
started from a position of equality of options (e.g. Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism, pp. 60-61). In the 
remainder of the paper, I assume that we are considering circumstances in which any background conditions for 
substantively responsibility, other than the reasonability condition, have already been met. 
45 Rakowski, Equal Justice, esp. ch. 3. Zofia Stemplowska, ‘Rescuing Luck Egalitarianism from History’, Journal of 
Social Philosophy 44 (2013): 402-419 argues that even early statements of luck egalitarianism by Cohen, Dworkin and 
Arneson, which are sometimes thought of as having endorsed the view that agents are always substantively responsible 
for the outcome of their risky choices, did not in fact endorse such a view. 
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condition, or something like it. And the central challenge of providing that explanation remains, as 
yet, very much unmet. 
